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COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK LAW
POE v. MISSING PERSONS:
COPYRIGHT SCRUTINY OF A "WORK OF ART"

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Poe v. Missing Persons/ the Ninth Circuit held that a
jury could have found that plaintiff's "swimming suit" was a
work of art entitled to copyright protection under the Federal
Copyright Act. 2 The Ninth Circuit determined that the question
of whether an article of clothing is strictly a utilitarian item,
therefore not copyrightable, raised a genuine issue of material
fact thereby precluding summary judgment. 3
Plaintiff, a designer of high fashion clothing, designed a
"swimming suit" which he described as a work of art.· Plaintiff
sought damages when a photograph of one of the defendants
wearing the design appeared on the cover of a record album
which had received national distribution. Plaintiff contended
that this unauthorized copying of his design constituted copyright infringement. 6
1. 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Alarcon, J.; the other panel members were
Wallace, J. and Pregerson, H.)
2. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Plaintiff's creation, "Aquatint No.5," was
an article of clothing resembling a woman's two-piece swimming suit. 745 F.2d at 1239.
3. ld. at 1243.
4. Plaintiff contended that his creation was "an artwork in the medium of soft
sculpture entitled Aquatint No.5." ld. at 1239.
5. As a student at the California Institute of the Arts in 1978, plaintiff designed
"Aquatint No.5." Plaintiff entered the design in an art show sponsored by the Los Angeles Institute for Contemporary Art shortly after he created it. At the art show plaintiff
permitted a photographer friend to photograph Dale Bozzio, as member of the rock
group "Missing Persons," for his friend's professional portfolio. The photograph was reproduced on the cover of the album titled "Missing Persons." Although plaintiff gave his
permission for the photograph to be taken, he did not consent to the photograph's placement on the defendant's album cover. ld. at 1240.
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Plaintiff sued for copyright infringement and for violation
of section 43 (a) of the Lanham Trademark Act. s The district
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on
both claims,7 concluding that the design was not copyrightable
because the functional aspects of the work were not independently separable from the artistic aspects of the work. 8 Plaintiff
then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 9
II.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit held that summary judgment was correct
only if no genuine factual issue existed on the question of
whether the artistic features of the work could be identified separately from and exist independently of the useful features of
the work. 1o
The Ninth Circuit court reviewed the summary judgment de
novo on the issue of whether the creation was a "useful article."ll On appeal, plaintiff contended that the evidence raised an
issue of material fact as to whether the design was a soft sculpture or a useful article. 12 Defendants offered evidence that the
design was worn by a woman for the photograph, thus proving
the utilitarian nature of plaintiffs design. The Ninth Circuit
6. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
7. Plaintiff had filed a declaration on appeal in opposition to the summary judgment
to give factual support to his argument that "Aquatint No.5" was a work of art. He
described the design: "It is an artist's impression or rendering of an article of clothing
and in this context I developed, created and originated this work as an artist. It stands
by itself as a work of conceptual art." Id. at 1240.
8. A description of the design lends credence to any reference to the "swimming
suit" as a work of art. The suit is a two piece design. The top part of it consists of two
pieces of clear plastic cut in a figure eight shape. Within each loop of the figure eight is a
triangular piece of clear plastic filled with crushed rock in bright colors. The other section consists of two pieces of clear plastic which were cut into octogonal shapes and
connected together by plastic. Within each octogon, there is a sealed area which also
contains crushed rock in the same colors as are in the top half. Id. at 1241.
9. Id. at 1240.
10. The Act defines "useful article" and then describes how the article may be considered a work of art: "the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if. . .such design incorporates
pictorial, graphic or sculptural features than can be identified separately from, and are
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of this article." Copyright
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
11. A "useful article" under the Act is an "article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." Id.
12. 745 F.2d at 1240.
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criticized the district court's holding based on this evidence
since the evidence clearly demonstrated that plaintiff intended
to create a work of art which portrayed a swimming suit. I3 The
court noted that portrayal of the appearance of an article of
clothing is not enough to disallow copyright protection. 14
After a visual examination of the design, however, the Ninth
Circuit could not determine whether one could walk, let alone
swim, while wearing plaintiff's creation. Since the Ninth Circuit
assumed that the district court's determination was based on
visual examination of the article, and since some evidence Iii was
in the record showing that the article was a work of art and not
a functional item, the court reasoned that an issue of fact existed which should have been determined by the jury.I6
Defendants relied on Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp.,!' and
argued that the question of whether an item is a "useful article"
or a "work of art" under the Copyright Act is a question of law
and not of fact.I8 However, the court distinguished Fabrica by
pointing out that Fabrica did not support defendants' argument
and that in Poe, the evidence showed that the only reason for
the existence of the plaintiff's creation was as a work of art for
display.I9
13. The court noted that the issue of whether the article was in fact "visual art" or a
"useful article" of clothing had to be determined by examining the evidence offered
before the district court. After visually examining plaintiff's creation, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that they could not determine as a matter of law whether the article could be
worn as an article of clothing for swimming or any other functional purpose. Id. at 1242.
14.Id.
15. The plaintiff had testified that "Aquatint No.5" had been entered at the Los
Angeles Institute of Contemporary Art show as a "three-dimensional work of art in primarily flexible clear vinyl covered rock media." Id. at 1240.
16. The record showed that at best, the district court judge believed that the design
looked like a swimming suit. Id. at 1242.
17. 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983).
18. This is not what is expressed in Fabrica. On the page cited by defendants, the
opinion quotes the section of the Act which describes the type of pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works for which copyright protection is given: "two dimensional and three
dimensional works of fine, graphic and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, technical drawings, diagrams and models." Copyright Act
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). The opinion does not hold that the usefulness of an article is a
question of law. 745 F.2d at 1242.
19. In Fabrica, the Ninth Circuit held that the disputed item had no artistic feature
which was separately identifiable from the useful function of the article. The item was a
carpet sample display folder. Defendants in Fabrica did not contend that the folder was
not useful; they alleged that the design of the folder was separately identifiable as a work
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The defendants also argued that Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L.
Corp.20 supported their argument that the issue of usefulness is
a question of law, however, the Ninth Circuit stated that the
case was not applicable to these facts. 21 In Gay Toys, the issue
was whether toys are copyrightable, not whether the article was,
in fact, a toy. In Poe, the issue was whether a genuine issue of
fact existed with respect to whether plaintiff designed a work of
art, or a strictly utilitarian article. 22
The court concluded that the question of whether any functional aspects of plaintiff's creation can be separated from the
artistic aspects is a question of fact which must be presented to
the jury.23 Evidence which may be offered to make this determination includes expert opinion,u evidence of the creator's intentions, and testimony concerning the customs of using such objects in the art or commercial trade world. The court also noted
that the district court could also consider evidence of the creation's marketability in the art world. 25

III.

CONCLUSION

Although the Ninth Circuit properly construed Section 101
of the Copyright Act in determining whether an issue of fact existed in Poe, the court left an important question open on what
standard should be applied to determine whether a specific creation is a work of art or a strictly utilitarian article. There is a
potential problem in holding that an article of clothing created
as a work of art is not a "useful article" under the Copyright
of art from its function as a folder. The court determined that since the only reason for
the folder's existence was its usefulness in marketing carpet samples, the design was not
separately identifiable. 697 F.2d at.892·93.
20. 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983).
21. In Gay Toys, the issue before the court was the copyrightability of a toy airplane. The district court had held that a toy airplane is a useful article which was not
copyrightable. The Sixth Circuit held that a toy airplane has no intrinsic utilitarian
function and therefore is not a "useful article" within the meaning of the statute. 703
F.2d at 970.
22. 745 F.2d at 1242.
23. [d. at 1243.
24. In a footnote, the court mentioned that the plaintiff himself may qualify as an
expert in light of his academic training and his experience as an artist and fashion designer. Although plaintiff is clearly an interested party, and his expert testimony would
undoubtedly be suspect, the court was willing to allow him to testify on his own behalf as
an expert. [d. n.2.
25. [d.
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Act; namely, the extent to which such an article of clothing may
be useful before it loses its copyright protection as a work of art.
The holding in Poe indicates that there will be more litigation
on this issue.
David Greenwald*

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986.
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LITCHFIELD v. SPIELBERG:
THE SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Litchfield v. Spielberg, 1 the Ninth Circuit held that summary judgment is proper in a copyright infringement action
where no reasonable jury could find there was substantial similarity between the allegedly infringed and allegedly infringing
work. 2 The court also dismissed causes of action for unfair competition and misrepresentation because state law is preempted
by the Copyright Act of 1976 in copyright infringement actions. 3
Plaintiff, author of the musical play Lokey from Maldemar,
alleged that the producers of the motion picture E. T.-The Extra- Terrestrial had infringed her copyright. Plaintiff sued under
the Federal Copyright Act and under the Lanham Trademark
Act4 for "reverse passing off." The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the copyright infringement and Lanham Act claims, and dismissed the state claims.
Plaintiff then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. I!
1. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Wright, E.A.; the other panel members were
Ferguson, J. and Reinhardt, J.).
2. Id. at 1356.
3. Title 17, the Copyright Act of 1976, preempted the entire field of copyright.
There is no longer a common law right of copyright. Thus, the authority for any sate
claims which previously might have been attached to a copyright infringement cause of
action are now governed by Title 17. Section 301 of the Act provides:
(a) On and after January 1, 1978 all legal or equitable rights
that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
103, whether published or unpublished are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any
such right or equivalent right in any such work under the
common law or status of any state.
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976).
4. Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1975).
5. The play Lokey from Maldemar had been written and publicly performed in
1978. Plaintiff had submitted the play to defendants for consideration as a screenplay
twice; once in its original form and once as a screenplay. Defendants rejected both efforts. In 1982 defendant's movie E. T.-The Extraterrestrial was released to commercial

234
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THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

A.

Summary Judgment

The Ninth Circuit held that summary judgment is correct
only if no reasonable jury could find that the works in issue are
substantially similar.s In Litchfield, access to the copyrighted
work and the validity of plaintiff's copyright were not in
dispute. 7
The court, citing Twentieth Century-Fox Corp. v. MCA,
Inc.,s stated that summary judgment may be appropriate in copyright infringement actions. The court noted, however, that the
standard for granting summary judgment is difficult to meet. 9
theaters. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff brought suit. Although the Ninth Circuit never
referred to plaintiff's suit as frivolous, their treatment of the facts, in light of the protection afforded a copyright owner under the Act, indicates plaintiff's action was meritless.
Id.
6. The substantial similarity test is one part of a three part test for copyright infringement. To prevail in a copyright infringement action, plaintiff must show ownership
of the copyright, access to the copyrighted work, and substantial similarity between the
allegedly infringed and allegedly infringing works. The court cited See v. Durang, 711
F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983) in which the court noted that their review of summary
judgment was de novo. Thus, the court made detailed comparisons of the two works for a
determination of substantial similarity. Id. at 1356.
7. In Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation v. MCA, 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.
1983) the primary issue for trial was also substantial similarity. Plaintiffs were the producers of the motion picture Star Wars. They alleged that their rights were infringed by
the defendant's production of the television series Battlestar Galactica. Id. at 1328.
B. Unlike Litchfield, the court in Twentieth Century-Fox held that summary judgment was not properly granted in the district court. A party will not prevail on summary
judgment in a copyright infringement action unless no genuine issues of material fact
exist with respect to questions of substantial similarity of idea and the expression of the
idea. Id. at 1329.
An idea alone is not protected by the Act. Rather, it is the expression of the idea
which is protected. Section 102 provides: "(b) In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1976). The court concluded that the questions of fact with respect to similarity were too
close to be dismissed summarily. However, the court expressly stated that they had no
opinion as to whether any similarity existed. Id.
9. The court set the standard for summary judgment: "A grant of summary judgment for plaintiff is proper where works are so overwhelmingly identical that the possibility of independent creation is precluded... Similarly, summary judgment for defendant is appropriate where works are so dissimilar that a claim of infringement is without
merit." 715 F.2d at 1330 (citing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 1366, 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) and Rose v. Connely, 38 F. Supp. 54, 55 (S.D.N.Y.
1941)).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 12

236

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:234

The court reviewed the summary judgment de novo on the
issue of substantial similarity and made independent comparisons of the two works. lo The court applied an extrinsic test to
determine similarity of ideas, and an intrinsic test to compare
similarity in expression of the ideas. 11
The court noted that although both works involved the adventures of aliens stranded on earth, they were not substantially
similar.l2 The court stated that although there were some similarities in the opening scenes of Lokey and E. T., the sequence of
events, mood, dialogue, and the characters depicted in the two
works was not substantially similar. Since ideas, by themselves,
are not protected by the Copyright Act, the court found that
similarities in the plot were mere generalities for which copy10. The court reviewed the script for the play Lokey, and the author's subsequent
screen adaptation of the play which they compared with the "continuity" script (a con·
densed form of the script) of E. T .. The court implied that a reading of a continuity
script will not always be sufficient to allow a comparison of a motion picture with other
works, but in this case the comparison was permissible since neither party claimed that
the continuity script varied from the film. [d. (citing Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104
F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939) and Jason v. Fonda, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982».
11. The extrinsic test involves comparisons of ideas embodied in the plot, theme,
dialogue, mood, setting, pace and sequence. The intrinsic test involves comparisons of
the total concept and feel of works. This test depends on the response of the reasonable
person to the works. Where total concept and feel of the two works are completely different, and the court can determine this as a matter of law, the grant of summary judgment
to the defendant is proper.
In Jason v. Fonda, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit offered a grant of
summary judgment to defendants in plaintiff's copyright infringement action. Plaintiff
alleged that her book Concomitant Soldier was infringed by defendant Jane Fonda's
motion picture Coming Home. Summary judgment was granted on two grounds. Plaintiff
had failed to show that defendant had access to her work. Additionally, the court determined that, as a matter of law, there was no substantial similarity between the two
works. In finding that no genuine issues of fact existed, the court read both the book and
the continuity script from the movie, and found that there was no substantial similarity.
The court noted that any similarity was too general to be protected by the copyright Act.
[d. at 967.
12. Lokey was a musical, E. T. was not. Even more significant was the difference
between the treatment of the characters and plot in Lokey and E. T. In Lokey, two aliens
landed at the North Pole, traveled to a beach in Japan, and then to the Andes Mountains. The Ninth Circuit found that the plot in E. T. was clearly different. All the action
in E. T. took place in and around a suburban California home where E. T. developed a
psycho-physical empathy with a 10 year old boy. The dramatic ending in E. T. marked
the final key difference between the two works. As time passed, E. T. deteriorated and
was eventually captured by scientists. At the end of the film, just as it appeared that
E. T. would die in captivity, he suddenly came to life and was rescued by fellow aliens
from his home planet. A chase ensued and the film ended with E. T. returning home. 736
F.2d at 1355.
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right protection is not granted. 13 Therefore, the court concluded
that no reasonable person could view E. T. as a dramatization of
Lokey and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. 14
The court also ruled on a claim plaintiff failed to raise at
trial. The court ruled on plaintiff's claim that defendants prepared a derivative work based on Lokey which violated the Copyright Act. 111 The court granted· summary judgment because
there cannot be a derivative work without a showing of substantial similarity.16 Since the court found no substantial similarity,
in either idea or expression, between the two works, it concluded
that E. T. could not be a derivative work.
B.

"Reverse Passing Off"

The Ninth Circuit also dismissed plaintiff's claim for "reverse passing off,"17 noting that to successfully allege a violation
13. [d. at 1357.
14. [d.

15. The Copyright Act provides that the owner of the copyright has the exclusive
right to propose derivative works based on the copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106
(1976).
16. In order to qualify as a derivative work under the Act, the work must incorporate, in some form, a portion of the copyrighted work. One of the exclusive rights of
copyright is the right to create a derivative work. A derivative work is one which is based
on the copyrighted work. Thus, an infringing work must incorporate a portion of the
copyrighted work in some form. Examples of derivative works include a motion picture
version of a book or play. However, a detailed commentary on a work or a musical composition inspired by a novel would not normally constitute infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
17. "Reverse passing off" is a cause of action the Ninth Circuit allows under the
Lanham Trademark Act where a party attempts to pass another party's product off to
the public under another name by substituting a name for the owner's name. The Lanham Act provides for liability whenever a party uses "false designations of origin and
false descriptions or representations in the advertising and sale of goods and services."
See Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 43(a).
The court in Litchfield relied on their decision in Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602
(9th Cir. 1981), in which they interpreted the Lanham Act very broadly. The Ninth Circuit held that the Act extends protection to motion pictures. Further, in Smith the court
noted that the Second Circuit allowed a cause of action under the Lanham Act for "reverse passing off" in any instance where the defendant obtains plaintiff's product,
removes the plaintiff's name and replaces it with a name of his choice. [d. at 607.
In Smith, a film distributor removed an actor's name from the film credits and advertising material and substituted a different name; this amounted to "reverse passing
off". There is a distinction between what is called "reverse passing off" and "passing
off". When the latter occurs, someone has sold a good or service of his creation under
someone else's name. "Reverse passing off" refers to the situation where the good or
service is someone else's and the infringer has removed the trademark or name before
reselling the good or service under a different name. In Smith, the plaintiff contracted to
star in an Italian movie. He was to receive star billing in the screen credits and advertis-
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under the Lanham Act plaintiff must show that her play was
being "passed off" on the public as the defendant's work. The
initial step in showing this requires a finding that the two works
are substantially similar. Absent a finding of substantial similarity, the Lanham Act is inapplicable. Since no substantial similarity was found in either idea or expression between the works,
the court determined that there could be no Lanham Act
violation. 18

C. The Preemption Doctrine
Finally, plaintiff's state claims were dismissed on the
grounds that they were preempted by federal copyright law. 19 In
applying the preemption doctrine, the Ninth Circuit noted that
the Copyright Act states that if a work fits within the general
subject matter of copyright, the state protection, either by statute or common law, is inapplicable and the cause of action is
preempted. 20 Similarly, the Act provides that no state copyright
protection is available for works once they have been "fixed" in
any tangible medium of expression.21
III.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit seems to believe that many copyright
suits are misguided 22 due to a lack of knowledge and understanding with respect to the scope of copyright protection. 2S
Copyright protection is not given to ideas unless the court finds
that both the ideas and the expression of the ideas are substantially similar.
ing of the film. Defendant removed plaintiff's name and substituted the name of another
actor. Plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging violation of section 43 of the Lanham Act. [d. at 605.
18. If no federal claim can be brought, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to
hear any pendant state claims. For this reason the Ninth Circuit dismissed plaintiff's
state claims outside the scope of claims preempted by the Copyright Act. 736 F.2d at
1358.
19. The Copyright Act preempts common law copyright claims arising from works
commenced before January 1, 1978. If a work is not "fixed" in a tangible medium of
expression, there is still common law protection of the copyright and the federal statutory copyright has not been initiated. The state rights which are preempted by the statute include only rights that are equivalent to the exclusive rights of copyright as specified in the Act. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
20. 736 F.2d at 1358.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
22. 736 F.2d at 1358.
23. [d.
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Application of the "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" tests for substantial similarity clearly demonstrates that there was insufficient similarity between the works in Litchfield to give rise to a
cause of action.24 Arguably, the Ninth Circuit's "extrinsic" and
"intrinsic" tests are proper in copyright infringement cases. 211 In
any event, the tests were correctly applied in Litchfield.
David Greenwald*

24. [d.
25. The Ninth Circuit has adopted its own version of the "extrinsic" and "intrinsic"
tests from the Second Circuit copyright infringement cases. See Sid and Marty Kroft
Television Production, Inc. v. McDonalds Corporation, 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
1977).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986.
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ESTABLISHING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF
TRADEMARK ABANDONMENT

I.

INTRODUCTION

In California Cedar Products u. Pine Mountain Corporation,l the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court2 properly determined when abandonment and subsequent appropriation of a
trademark becomes effective, and accordingly, affirmed the grant
of a preliminary injunction against trademark infringement. 3

Upon formal abandonment' of the "Duraflame" trademark
by the Kingsford Company, California Cedar immediately
claimed that it appropriated the trademark by making the first
subsequent commercial use.1! However, competitors also asserted
1. 724 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Tang, J.; the other panel members were Reinhardt, J. and Swygert, United States Circuit Judge for the Seven Circuit, sitting by
designation).
2. A. Andrew Hauk, Senior District Judge; United States District Court for the Central District of California.
3. 724 F.2d at 827.
4. [d. at 829. The effective date of formal abandonment of the "Duraflame" trademark was the primary issue in dispute. In a company report of March 31. 1982. Kingsford disclosed its intention to withdraw from the artificial fire log market at an appropriate future date. Despite negotiation with several corporations, including the parties to
this action to transfer the right to the trademark, Kingsford decided to write off the
valuable goodwill associated with the trademark as a tax deduction. [d. Formal abandonment of a trademark can often provide a greater financial benefit than an outright sale.
See Manhattan Industries, Inc. v. Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 629 (2nd.
Cir. 1980).
On April 21, 1982, Kingsford formally decided to withdraw from the market, and
authorized Mr. Bolingbroke, its vice-president, to decide the actual date of abandonment. Negotiations to transfer the trademark rights continued, and on June 8, 1982
Kingsford granted California Cedar a right of first refusal to consider the purchase of the
"Duraflame" trademark.
On June 28, 1982, Kingsford announced in the Wall Street Journal that the formal
abandonment of the "Duraflame" trademark was effective that day. Also on June 28,
attorneys for Kingsford filed documents with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office to formally abandon the trademark that day. 724 F.2d at 829.
5. [d. The first to make a bona fide commercial use of an abandoned trademark
ordinarily acquires exclusive rights in that trademark. See Manhattan Industries, Inc. v.
Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d at 630; Sutton Cosmetics (P.R.) v. Lander Co., 455
F.2d 285, 288 (2nd Cir. 1972).
On June 28, 1982, the effective date of abandonment, California Cedar began selling

240
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priority by first commercial use 8 of the valuable 7 trademark, and
California Cedar sought a preliminary injunction8 to restrain
Pine Mountain and Consumer Chemical Corporation from using
the "Duraflame" trademark and trade dress. 9 The district court
granted a preliminary injunction 10 and Pine Mountain and Consumer Chemical appealed. l l
II.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit initially noted that to obtain a preliminary injunction, the petitioner must show either the probability
of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury
without an injunction, or that the balance of hardships strongly
favors the petitioner. 12 The court also stated that upon appellate
review, a preliminary injunction should be reversed only upon a
showing of a clear error of law or an abuse of discretion by the
district court. 13
fire logs in California and in interstate commerce, using the "Duraflame" trademark and
trade dress, identifying itself as the source of manufacture. On August 10, 1982, California Cedar sold "Duraflame" logs in Canada, and on October 7, 1982 California Cedar
made its first post-abandonment sale in Europe. 724 F.2d at 829.
6. [d. On June 26, 1982, Mr. Bolingbroke contacted Pine Mountain and disclosed
that Kingsford intended to formally abandon the "Duraflame" trademark on June 28.
He was unable to contact California Cedar until June 28. In an attempt to gain priority
by first commercial use, immediately after the June 26 phone call Pine Mountain expedited a shipment of artificial logs to Utah. The logs were packaged in a Duraflame wrapper that had been altered to indicate Pine Mountain as the source of manufacture. On
June 30, 1982, Consumer Chemical also packaged its logs in Duraflame wrappers, indicating Polysolve Corporation, an affiliate, as the manufacturer, and shipped them from
Canada to New York.
7. [d. The "Duraflame" trademark identified a successful manufacturer whose wellknown product commanded a dominant 50% share of the American artificial fire log
market by 1975. "Duraflame" logs were also sold in Europe and Canada.
8. [d. California Cedar brought an action for a preliminary injunction under § 43 (a)
of the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1982).
9. 724 F.2d at 829.
10. [d. at 829-30: The district court found that California Cedar made the first commercial use of the "Duraflame" trademark in the United States and in Europe after
formal abandonment by Kingsford. However, the court found that Consumer Chemical
made the first use of the abandoned trademark in Canada.
The district court consolidate the two cases, and issued a preliminary injunction
that enjoined: (1) Pine Mountain from using the "Duraflame" trademark and trade dress
in the United States, Canada, and Europe; (2) Consumer Chemical from using the trademark and trade dress in Europe and the United States; and (3) California Cedar from
using the trademark and trade dress in Canada. [d. at 830.
11. [d.
12. [d. (citing Beltran v. Meyers, 677 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1982».
13. [d. at 828.
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The appellants challenge to the injunction focused upon the
trial court's determination that California Cedar was likely to
prevail on the merits of its trademark infringement action. 14 Although the parties agreed that the first to use an abandoned
trademark in a commercially meaningful way was entitled to exclusive rights in the trademark, the appellants claimed that an
erroneous legal standard was used to determine the effective
date of abandonment.1&
The Ninth Circuit rejected the appellants' contention, and
concurred with the district court finding that June 28, 1982 was
the effective date of actual abandonment of the trademark. IS
The court noted that the finding of the effective abandonment
date was properly based upon the totality of the circumstances,
rather than solely upon the express intent of Kingsford. I7 The
panel stated that Kingsford explicitly declared its intention to
actually abandon the mark on June 28, 1982.18 Additionally, the
court observed that Kingsford conclusively demonstrated its intent to actually abandon the trademark on June 28, 1982 by its
notice of formal abandonment that was nationally published l9
and filed that same day with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office. 20
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Pine Mountain's claim that
even if June 28, 1982 was the actual date of abandonment, it
established priority over California Cedar by making the first
14. 724 F.2d at 830. The court stated that upon review of the likelihood of success
on the merits, they consider whether the district court abused its discretion, relied upon
erroneous legal standards, or relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact. [d. See Miss
Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 1979).
15. 724 F.2d at 830. The appellants argued that although Kingsford intended the
abandonment of the trademark to become effective on June 28, the dispositive date of
actual abandonment occurred much earlier. Pine Mountain claimed that abandonment
occurred on June 26 when Mr. Bolingbroke informed them of Kingsford's intent to abandon the trademark. Consumer Chemical contended that abandonment was effective on
March 31, 1982 when Kingsford wrote off the goodwill of "Duraflame" as a tax
deduction.
16. 724 F.2d at 830.
17. [d.
18. [d. at 828.
19. [d. at 829. The Kingsford Company published a formal announcement in the

Wall Street Journal on June 28, 1982 to declare that the abandonment of the
"Duraflame" trademark was effective that day.
20. [d.
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subsequent commercial use. 21 The court chastised Pine Mountain and declared that the purported commercial use of the
trademark by a June 26, 1982 sale was made prematurely and in
bad faith, and thus could not usurp California Cedar's priority.2l!
Concluding its review of the preliminary injunction, the
court stated that since California Cedar acquired exclusive
rights to the "Duraflame" trademark and trade dress, it was evident that use of the mark by the appellants would possibly
cause irreparable injury.23 The panel also noted that because
California Cedar had always been the primary manufacturer of
"Duraflame" 10gs,24 and owned a large inventory of the logs,21!
the balance of hardships also strongly supported the grant of the
preliminary injunction. 26
III.

CRITIQUE

California Cedar Products provided the Ninth Circuit with
an opportunity to clarify the standard used to determine the
often complicated issues of when abandonment of a trademark
becomes effective. The totality of the circumstances test
presents a practicable approach that enables the lower courts to
consider all relevant factors that may indicate abandonment. 27
21. [d. at 830.
22. [d. See supra note 6. The court stated that Pine Mountain's claim of first commercial use of the trademark subsequent to abandonment conflicted with the district
court's finding that appellant did not use the mark in commerce until June 29, 1982.
Upon the clearly erroneous standard of review, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the district
court's findings were not clearly erroneous. 724 F.2d at 830.
23. [d. at 831.
24. [d. The court disclosed a chronology of the ownership of the "Duraflame" trademark and the production of the logs that begins and ends with California Cedar. In 1969,
California Cedar began to manufacture and market artifical fire logs. In 1970, California
Cedar Firelog Company, Inc., a separate corporate entity, changed its name to Duraflame
Inc. (Old Duraflame), and owned the exclusive rights to the "Duraflame" trademark.
Several years later, California Cedar began to manufacture logs on the East coast at a
new facility (New Duraflame Inc.). In 1978, the Kingsford Company purchased all the
stock of Old Duraflame Inc., and also acquired the "Duraflame" trademark and the land
owned by New Duraflame, Inc. California Cedar leased its production equipment to
Kingsford, but continued to manufacture the logs for Kingsford by agreement. Old
Duraflame Inc. was eventually merged into the Kingsford Company. [d. at 828-29.
25. [d. at 829. California Cedar agreed to purchase over $3 million dollars worth of
Kingsford's inventory of "Duraflame" logs on June 8, 1982.
26. [d. at 831. The court also noted that, unlike Pine Mountain and Consumer
Chemical, California Cedar only sold logs under the "Duraflame" trademark.
27. [d. at 830. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20. The court also noted that
Kingsford continued to negotiate a possible sale of the "Duraflame" trademark rights
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This standard also facilitates the crucial finding of priority of
commercial use between closely conflicting claims of subsequent
appropriation of an abandoned trademark.
Although the court stated that an abandoned trademark
may be appropriated by establishing the first subsequent use of
the mark in a "commercially meaningful way,"28 the panel neglected to clarify the requisite measure of use. It is uncertain
from this vague standard whether the requirement refers to the
type or the quantity of commercial use that must be established
to appropriate the trademark.29 This ambiguity will likely cause
additional confusion, and may encourage litigation to determine
whether an appropriated trademark was actually used in a
"commercially meaningful way."
Despite a sound analysis of the preliminary injunction, the
court only briefly noted several significant factors that may have
been the overriding reasons favoring California Cedar's claim of
priority. It may be reasonably concluded that the court was substantially influenced by California Cedar's prior ownership of
the "Duraflame" trademark, and its continuous production of
the logs since 1969. 30 Conversely, the court may have been repelled by Pine Mountain's attempt to establish the first commercial use of the trademark through a sales transaction conducted prior to the effective date of abandonment. 31
IV.

CONCLUSION

With the increasing frequency of corporate mergers and insolvencies, and the attendant abandonment of trademarks for
favorable tax benefits, California Cedar Products provides
timely clarification of the effective date of trademark abandonment. With a clear date of effective abandonment that tolls the
priority contest of appropriation, California Cedar Products may
until formal abandonment was announced on June 28. 724 F.2d at 830.
28. [d.
29. With the exception of sale and shipment dates, the court did not disclose any
facts concerning the purported use of the trademark in a "commercially meaningful
way" by the parties.
30. [d. at 828-29. See supra note 24.
31. [d. at 830. The court described Pine Mountain's June 26 sale as "premature and
in bad faith." [d. See supra note 6.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss1/12

16

Greenwald and Gaspich: Summaries: Copyright & Trademark Law

1985]

COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK

245

eliminate misguided attempts to surreptitiously gain priority
over corporate competitors.
James Gaspich*

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1985.
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